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ABSTRACT 
The global financial system has become highly connected and complex. Has been proven 
in practice that existing models, measures and reports of financial risk fail to capture 
some important systemic dimensions. Only lately, advisory boards have been established 
in high level and regulations are directly targeted to systemic risk. In the same direction, 
a growing number of researchers employ network analysis to model systemic risk in 
financial networks. Current approaches are concentrated on interbank payment network 
flows in national and international level. This work builds on existing approaches to 
account for systemic risk assessment in micro level. Particularly, we introduce the 
analysis of intra-bank financial risk interconnections, by examining the real case of 
“cheques-as-collateral” network for a major Greek bank. Our model offers useful 
information about the negative spillovers of disruption to a financial entity in a bank’s 
lending network and could complement existing credit scoring models that account only 
for idiosyncratic customer’s financial profile. Most importantly, the proposed 
methodology can be employed in many segments of the entire financial system, 
providing a useful tool in the hands of regulatory authorities in assessing more accurate 
estimates of systemic risk.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 epitomized the role of strong financial ties 
as a carrier for propagation of shocks. The rapid viral spreading of the financial turmoil 
from the US sub-prime mortgage market to mammoth international financial institutions 
manifested that global economy is based on numerous, strong, unexplored and 
unanticipated interdependencies among networks in credit, trade, investment and supply 
chains. Consequently, it is needed an innovative methodology that models the systemic 
risks of financial networks and can be used to design effective policies to reduce conflicts 
between local and global interests [1]. 
In this context, the European Central Bank studies the emerging aspects of systemic risk 
[2] and the European Commission established the European Systemic Risk Board as an 
independent EU body to anticipate systemic risks within the financial system. At the 
same time, a growing number of studies and conferences examine various aspects of 
financial networks and specifically, the modeling of systemic risk using mathematical 
network analysis [3]. Current analysis is focused on interbank payment network flows in 
national and international level [4].  
In the banking sector analysis, existing credit scoring models account only for 
idiosyncratic customer’s financial profile and do not anticipate systemic risk factors (e.g. 
a potential domino effect caused by the bankruptcy of a central node-customer) [5]. 
Financial volatility [6] and related statistical modes (e.g. VaR [7]) are not anymore 
adequate approximations for risk factors. Banks have no information about the negative 
spillovers of disruption to a financial entity in their lending network because they are not 
directly account for linkages among customers in order to determine counterparty losses, 
predict and anticipate failure cascades. Consequently, their financial statements and 
reports to regulatory authorities do not account for this serious source of systemic risks in 
the financial system.   
In our research, we extend the current analysis of interbank networks to intra-bank 
financial risk interconnections, namely the “cheques-as-collateral” network. The 
proposed model address and quantifies systemic default risk factors like chain bankruptcy 
caused by central customers of the “cheques-as-collateral” network. Based on the 
experimentation with a real dataset of 422 funded customers and using as collateral 783 
cheques, we found out that an initial failure of five customers, representing the 17% of 
the total value, results the subsequent failure of 15 customers, which represent the 41% of 
network’s total value.    
According to [8]: “If the recent crisis has taught us anything, it’s that risk to our system 
can come from almost any quarter. We must be able to look in every corner and across 
the horizon for dangers. During the crisis, our system was not able to do this. Financial 
systems are evolving rapidly and this evolution is endogenous”. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first Section underlines the growing importance of 
networks in modeling complex systems. Section 2 briefly discusses the main definitions 
of systemic risk and Section 3 states the scope of the paper. Relevant literature is 
reviewed in the next section. Section 5 introduces the “cheques-as-collateral” network. 
The next section refers to the dataset that is used to estimate the proposed model. Section 
7 analyzes the model and presents the results. The final section concludes and discusses 
ideas for further research.     
 
1. The growing importance of networks 
Barabasi’s work on modeling Internet and the Web networks revealed their self-similar 
structure [9], [10]. The power-law degree distribution, together with the “small-world” 
property of networks [11], initiated a vast amount of research on the statistical properties 
and implications of real networks in general [12], [13]. Network theory contributes useful 
methodologies developed in other disciplines such as Web analysis, epidemics, sociology 
and mathematics to enable risk assessment. For instance, the identification of hubs and 
authorities [14] and the diffusion of information in the Web [15] help to identify the 
driving forces of financial contagion in the banking sector. Financial networks are 
difficult to model because they are formed by dynamic and strong strategic interactions in 
different levels involving heterogeneous players.  
Nowadays, in the financial industries, stress testing and a more detailed analysis of the 
risk in the micro level (i.e. loan-level) rather than aggregate data, have replaced 
correlation risk models [8]. The focus is “Where possible, it is useful to do analysis at the 
individual loan level. And because it is difficult to reach agreement upon an analytical 
approach and the pace of adoption is slow, it may be best to start with simple risk 
measurements and work toward more sophisticated methods.” 
In this line of research, a growing number of researchers examine various aspects of 
financial networks and specifically, the modeling of systemic risk using mathematical 
network analysis [3]. Current analysis is focused on the systemic risk of intra-bank 
payment network flows in national and international level.  
 
2. Systemic risk 
Various definitions (often complementary) for systemic risk exist in the literature [16] [3] 
and is beyond the scope of the present paper to analyze them. 
A large price movement in the market or the announcement of company losses is not 
characterized as systemic risk. Systemic risk is not related to individual events but to 
collective reactions on them. The failure of large and interconnected financial institutions 
could cause negative externalities to economy as a whole. “Since the costs of a failure do 
not fall exclusively on the failing institution, there is an incentive for firms to take 
excessive risk and to invest less in risk management than is socially optimal” [3]. An 
analogous argument is valid for individual bank customers. Let us briefly describe 
systemic risk as: 
• The risk of disruption to a financial entity with spillovers to the real economy. 
• The risk of a crisis that stresses key intermediation markets and leads to their 
breakdown, which impacts the broader economy and requires government 
intervention. 
• Adverse general equilibrium amplification and persistence. 
According to the network perspective, systemic risk is:  
• The risk that critical nodes of a financial network cease to function as designed, 
disrupting linkages. 
• Financial contracts with externalities.  
Systemic risk is an issue of primer importance for the stability of the banking system and 
the financial contagion capability of particular banks contributes a major part in this risk. 
Only recently, systemic risk measures have been developed to account for the systemic 
risk in the bank sector [17]. 
 
3. Scope of the paper 
Risk is transferred, not transformed. This is true not only among banks or other financial 
entities but also among bank customers. Current risk systems do not account for linkages 
and failure cascades and are not able to determine counterparty losses. The mass 
aggregation of financial data (e.g. bank loans in financial statements, synthetic 
derivatives) eliminates valuable information about the origins of systemic risk.  
Our work initiates the discussion of exploring the systemic risk of individual bank 
customers to the bank’s loan portfolio. In particular, we are focused on the following 
tasks: 
• Collect data on interconnected bank customers and identify the network structure.   
• Assess the risk to a bank from its customer’s position in the “cheques-as-
collateral” network.  
• Identify “systemically important” nodes whose collapse can significantly impact 
the network.  
• Develop the ability to measure and rank nodes by their fragility.  
• Apply the growing understanding of network dynamics to intentionally design 
robust customer networks.  
The issue of analyzing a new dimension of the systemic risk and the associated contagion 
process for an individual bank is addressed. This task is undertaken by creating a network 
model for estimating the distribution of losses for a bank caused by the failure of 
individual customers, which have been funded by the bank. The followed approach is 
inspired by the Systemic Risk Network Model that accounts for inter-bank failures [17].   
 
4. Relevant literature 
Literature about systemic risk and contagion is fairly new and limited. This section is by 
no means an exhaustive review of the fast evolving literature in the network analysis of 
systemic risk, but only highlights some major developments in relative research efforts. 
[18] created a theoretical framework to investigate interbank lending and systemic risk 
and concluded that interbank lending could be used for prudential control. [19] simulated 
the effects of failure in major US banks. Based on his work many scholars investigated 
financial contagion in different countries (e.g. UK [20]).  
Networks have been applied in several fields of economics (for reviews see [21], [22]). 
The main application of network theory to financial contagion refers to modeling 
interbank markets based on data from banks’ balance sheets and interbank payments [23]. 
Banks are the nodes, inter-connected if financial flows and exposures exist among them. 
[24] investigate the effect of variations in different parameters (e.g. the bank’s 
capitalization) on bank failures due to contagion. [25] develop a model of contagion in 
arbitrary financial networks and conclude that financial systems may exhibit a robust-yet-
fragile tendency. Similar models have been applied to national interbank markets. For 
instance, [26] provide a time-varying analysis of the Italian overnight market network 
and [27] assess the potential for contagion in the Swiss interbank market.  
 
5. The “cheques-as-collateral” network 
5.1.  Introduction  
Unlike the rest modern economies, it is a common practice in Greek B2B and B2C 
commerce to make the payments of liabilities by cheques with late maturity. Many 
professionals put these cheques as collateral to receive working capital credit from 
commercial banks. The approved credited amount as percentage of the cheques’ value 
varies from 70% to 90% for more trustworthy customers. Bank receives commission for 
the provided services raging approximately to the 7‰ of cheque’s amount plus the 
interest charge on capital (today varies between 8%-10%). According to the inter bank 
analysis agency, Tiresias (teiresias.gr), the total value of bounced cheques was more than 
3 billion euros in 2009, 2.3 billions in 2010 and 1.4 billion during the first six months of 
2011.  
If a cheque issuer, bankrupts then cheques that has issued cannot be paid (often called 
“bounced cheques”). As results of this, the bank customer, who has used her cheques as 
collateral has to undertake the failed payment. In such case, the risk for the lending bank 
is similar to the default loan risk. If a cheque recipient, who has received credit based on 
her customers’ cheques as collateral, bankrupts, it is assumed that she is not able to pay 
her cheques, but her customers’ cheques will be settled. In this case, the risk for the 
lending bank comes from the possibility that the defaulted customers’ cheques become 
bounced. This kind of risk is less important than the default loan risk because cheque 
issuers have not been bankrupted.   
 
5.2.  Assumptions 
For our model, bank customers are considered to be cheque issuers or/and recipients. 
Check recipients can use their incoming cheques, which may have different maturity 
dates (commonly received as payments by their customers in exchange to good or service 
provision) as collateral to working capital credit. The “cheques-as-collateral” network is 
formed as follows: if customer i have issued one or more cheques to customer j, the link 𝑖 ! 𝑗 exists with weight w. W is equal to the fraction of the value of cheques that 
customer i have issued to customer j, 𝑑!", to the total value of cheques in euros, V, 
received by the bank as collateral to loans during a specific period of time (model 
variables are presented in Table 1). When a customer bankrupts, it is assumed that her 
issued cheques (out-degree) are not paid, but the received cheques (in-degree) are fully 
paid by the issuers to the bank, which has received them as collateral from the failed 
customer.  
It is also assumed that all cheques have been issued in the beginning of the year and they 
will be paid at their maturity date. When a cheque recipient uses a new cheque as 
collateral in order to receive funding, the weight of the new cheque is added in the 
existing weight between cheque recipient and cheque issuer.  
 
n total number of bank customers 
i  cheque issuer, 1, 2, …, p  
j cheque recipient, 1, 2, …, m  𝑙! loss to the network given failure of customer i 𝑑!"    total exposure of customer i to customer j or total value of cheques in euros   
issued/paid by customer i to customer j during a specific period of time  𝑉 total value of cheques in euros received by the bank as collateral to loans during a 
specific period of time  
k stage of financial contagion caused by an initial shock 𝑢!! failure/bankruptcy threshold for customer 𝑖 at stage k (0,1] 
c percentage of total losses that collapse the node (0,1] 𝑤!" link weight, !!"!  , (0,1] 𝑖 ! 𝑗   customer i have issued one or more cheques to customer j, with weight 𝑤 
θ a state variable that indicates whether a bank customer is failed or not {0,1} 𝐷! set of failed customers at stage 𝑘, [0,422] 
Table 1:  description of the “cheques-as-collateral” model variables 
6. Data 
Our sample is the “cheques-as-collateral” network of a leading Greek bank’s local branch 
data collected from 31/03/2009 until 31/03/2010. The network is based on the 33 
customers of this branch that have been financed by setting as collateral their received 
cheques. 422 nodes that are connected through 450 links form the network under 
consideration (Table 2). Each link is weighted by the fraction of total exposure of 
customer i to customer j, to the total value of issued cheques. For example, an issued 
cheque of 10,000 euros weights 0.232 (=100,000/4,306,735). The examined network is 
sparse and not weakly connected because it contains unconnected components. The 
“cheques-as-collateral” network is depicted in Figure 1 based on [28] and the darker link 
lines indicate higher weight for the link between two customers. The examined sample 
network is considered to be scale-free, as many other real networks (e.g. the Web [10]) 
with power-law exponent of the in-degree distribution to equal 1.3). 
 
Nodes (customers) 422 
 
Links (issued cheques) 450 
Average degree 2,13 
Max in-degree 108 
Max out-degree 3 
Weakly connected False 
Average path length 1.72 
Diameter 6 
Power law exponent 1.3 
Total value of issued cheques (€) 4,306,735 
Funded customers 33 
Number of Communities 33 
 
 
 
 
Many real networks are characterized by their modular structure. Specific groups of 
nodes are more densely interconnected with a group of nodes than with the rest of the 
network (also called communities or cohesive subgroups or clusters [29]). The network is 
consisted of 33 distinct communities formed by the funded customers (Table 2).  
 
 
 
Node  In-degree Weighted in-degree 
1002 108 28.64 
1001 55 10.57 
1011 41 15.47 
1019 35 10.69 
1013 23 3.29 
Table 3: the top five in-degree customers and their associated weighted in-degree  
 
Figure 1: visualization of the “cheques-
as-collateral” 
Table 2: descriptive statistics for the 
“cheques-as-collateral” network 
 
The node in-degree in the “cheques-as-collateral” network describes the number of 
different cheque issuers that a funded customer uses as collateral. Weighted in-degree 
refers to the value of cheques that a funded customer contributes in the “cheques-as-
collateral” network. In the examined network, the top funded customer brings also the 
largest number of cheques (Table 3). 1002 belongs to the house construction industry and 
has a long term and trustworthy credit history. 1001 is specialized in supplying products 
for personal Hygiene & Sanitation and Equipment Office & Stores. 1011 shells plastic 
tanks and pipes, while 1029 is the biggest gas-petrol station in the area.  
 
 
Node Betweenness centrality 
1029 150.5 
1011 109.0 
1031 80.5 
1017 74.5 
1019 68.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node betweenness centrality is the number of shortest paths going through the node and 
describes the extent to which a node lies between other nodes in the network. This 
measure takes into account the connectivity of the node’s neighbors, giving a higher 
value for nodes which bridge clusters, indicating how often a node is found on a shortest 
path between two nodes in the network. For a graph G: = (V, E) with n nodes, the 
betweenness CB (v) for node v is given by: 
 𝐶! 𝜈 = 𝜎!"(𝑣)𝜎!"!!!!!!!  
 
where σst is the number of shortest paths from s to t, and σst (v) is the number of shortest 
paths from s to t that pass through a node v. 
In the “cheques-as-collateral” network betweenness centrality captures the connectivity 
among the cheque issuers that are used as collateral for funded customers. It could be an 
indication of how often funded customers exploit the same cheque issuers, and thus 
increasing the systemic risk in the network. In the network under investigation, some of 
customers with high funding are in the top positions because use cheque issuers with high 
involvement in other funded customers (Table 4 and Figure 2).   
Figure 2: top five customers with respect to 
betweenness centrality  	  Table 4: Top five customers with respect to betweenness centrality  	  
7. The model 
The most interesting case of financial contagion in the “cheques-as-collateral” network 
emerges when a check issuer cannot pay her cheques and as result of this, the recipients 
of her cheques cannot also pay (part or all) of their issued cheques. Current risk 
management models are not capturing this domino effect, because are based on 
idiosyncratic financial evaluation for each customer. Often existing approaches evaluate 
customers in a binary format (good or bad), according their repayment performance over 
a fixed time period (see for instance [30]). The two mainstream approaches occupied in 
credit scoring are discriminant analysis (see for instance [31]) and logistic regression 
analysis (see for instance [32]). The majority of these methodologies are time invariant 
and rank bank customers mainly according to their characteristics as have been filled on 
their application form and their credit history. Banks are not accounting for linkages 
among customers and thus cannot determine counterparty losses, predict and anticipate 
failure cascades. The bank has no information about the negative spillovers of disruption 
to a financial entity in its lending network.  
Current analysis aims to complement existing evaluation procedures by offering 
additional information with respect to the systemic effect of every customer.    
For our model, 𝐹 denotes the set of failed bank customers in the initial shock, and 𝐿 𝐹  
are the losses to the system if “scenario F occurs”. 𝐿 includes the decrease in total value 
of cheques received by the bank as collateral to loans that has been caused due to losses 
of the customers, which fail in the initial shock, and the losses due to the contagion 
generated by these customers. Following the analysis of [17], since we model contagion 
as a deterministic process, the customers that fail due to contagion of initially failed 
customers in 𝐹, are unique. If 𝐶 𝐹  is defined to be the set of customers that fail due to 
contagion whose source is F, then the total loss for a given scenario F is: 
 𝐿 𝐹 = 𝑙!!∈! + 𝑙!!∈!(!)  
 
If it is assumed that the failure probabilities of customers are independent, probability of 
occurrence of this loss is given by: 
 𝑃 𝐹 = 𝑝!!∈! (1− 𝑝!)!∈!~  
  
where 𝐹~  is the complement of 𝐹 (the not failed bank customers). 
 
Given the above definitions, we introduce a discrete model of financial contagion for 
assessing systemic risk in the “cheques-as-collateral” network. First, let us assume that at 
every stage of contagion and for each customer j, there is a specific “threshold” 𝑢!!, such 
that if a customer’s exposure to previously defaulted customers exceeds the threshold, 
that customer will also fail. 𝐷! is the set of all customers that have failed by stage k. 
Hence, customer j will fail at stage k + 1 if the following condition holds: 
 
If   𝑤!"!∈!! ≥ 𝑢!!!!  then j defaults:  𝑗 ∈ 𝐷!!!   (1) 
 
 
where 𝑤!"!∈!!  is the sum of defaulted exposures of customer i to j at stage k and c is 
defined to be the percentage of total losses from unpaid cheques that drive every bank 
customer to failure (i.e. the “failure or bankruptcy threshold”). The failure threshold for 
customer j at stage 𝑘 is given by the formula 𝑢! = 𝑐 𝑤!"!!!! .   
It is also necessary to define a state variable in order to indicate whether a customer is 
failed or not at stage k of the contagion process as: 
 𝜃!! = 1  𝑖𝑓   𝑤!" ≥ 𝑢!!!∈!!!!0                                                          𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒       (2) 
 
 
As an illustrative example, consider a small part of the “cheques-as-collateral” network 
consisting of six customers and six issued cheques and weights as depicted in Figure 3. 
Let us assume that the percentage of total loss from unpaid cheques, which drive every 
bank customer to failure c, equals 0.5, that is, at least, 50% of the value of the received 
cheques has not been paid.   
 
Figure 3: an example of “cheques-as-collateral” network consisting of six customers and 
six issued cheques with the associated weights.  
 
It is also assumed that at stage 𝑘 = 0 customer 1 fails to pay the cheques issued by her. 
The failure thresholds for the recipients of her cheques, 𝑢!  and  𝑢!  equal 0.16 and 0.25, 
respectively. The sum of the defaulted exposures for customer 2 exceeds her failure 
threshold and according to formula (1) also fails at stage 1. Contrastingly, customer 4 
survives in this stage because her defaulted exposures are less than the corresponding 
threshold. In the following stage, due to the financial contagion customer 4 is affected by 
the failure of 2 and also fails. 
 
7.1. Algorithm 
The algorithm that is used to calculate the propagation of financial contagion in the 
“cheques-as-collateral” is minutely presented in the following lines1. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Matlab code and data are available upon request. 
Step 0 
1. Assume a set of criteria for the failure of every customer (𝑐). Here it is assumed 
that 𝑐 is the percentage of the total amount of unpaid cheques that drives every 
bank customer to failure.  
2. For a given “cheques-as-collateral” network, calculate the weighted adjacency 
matrix (𝑊). 
3. Calculate the failure threshold for every customer j, 𝑢! = 𝑐 𝑤!"!!!! . It is assumed 
that this threshold remains constant at every stage 𝑘.  
4. Assume a set of customers that initially fail to pay their cheques (𝐷!!!). This set 
can be chosen by some relevant criterion. In our case, five customers with the 
highest weighted out-degree have been selected to collapse at stage 𝑘 = 0 and 
their relevant state variable 𝜃 is set to be equal to 1.   
 
Step 1 
1. Calculate the sum of the defaulted exposures of failed customer i to j, 𝑤!"!∈!! .  
2. Compare the calculated defaulted exposure failure threshold of customer j. If (1) 
holds then customer 𝑗 fails at this stage, 𝑗 ∈ 𝐷!!!. 
3. Update 𝐷! with the failed customers.  
 
Step 2 
1. Repeat Step 1 until 𝐷! = 𝐷!!!. 
 
 
The first assumption in the initial step can be relaxed to include more sophisticated and 
personalized criteria for customer bankruptcy. Similarly, the fourth assumption in this 
step can be modified to encapsulate credit risk (e.g. customers form sectors with high risk 
and interconnections) and other network criteria (e.g. eigenvector centrality) to select the 
initially failed set of customers.   
 
7.2. Results  
The “cheques-as-collateral” network under investigation is formed by 422 customers and 
783 cheques, which are aggregated to 450 financial links (Figure 4a). Let us assume 
again that the percentage of total losses from unpaid cheques that drive every bank 
customer to failure c, equals 0.5, that is, at least, 50% of the value of the received cheques 
has not been paid. It is also assumed that at stage 𝑘 = 0, five customers with the highest 
weighted out-degree fail to pay their cheques, causing a 17.11% decrease in the total 
value of the cheques network. Applying algorithm (1), results the failure of 4 customers 
at stage 2, increasing the devaluation to 26.62% (Figure 4b). The financial contagion 
expands further to four stages resulting the failure of 15 customers, which represent the 
40.68% of underlying cheques total value (Figure 4f).   
 
 
 
  
a: stage 0 b: stage 1 c: stage 2 
Number of failed nodes: 5 Number of failed nodes: 4 Number of failed nodes: 3 
Decrease in total value: 17.11% Decrease in total value: 26.62% Decrease in total value: 38.04% 
  
 
d: stage 3 e: stage 4 f: The network after the shock 
Number of failed nodes: 2 Number of failed nodes: 1 Total number of failed nodes: 15 
Decrease in total value: 40.68% Decrease in total value: 40.68%  Decrease in total value: 40.68% 
Figure 4: financial contagion in the “cheques-as-collateral” network at every stage (green 
numbers indicate the nodes that collapse in the every stage).  
 
7.3. Evaluating the systemic risk of a bank customer 
7.3.1. Case 1: stage-by-stage loss 
For every Greek commercial bank it is important to make a decision about additional 
financing of existing customers by accepting new cheques as collateral. In this context, a 
systemic risk measurement for each customer is proposed. The measurement is given by 
applying the algorithm in Section 7.1 in the case of failure of an individual node and by 
calculating the resulting financial contagion (i.e. the total number of failed nodes and the 
total value decrease). Table 5 presents the case of the five most “dangerous” customers in 
terms of causing financial contagion. If it is assumed that the percentage of total losses 
that drive every customer to failure, c, equals 0.5, then 1005 causes the most serious 
domino effect in the network. In this case, total loss has calculated by assuming that loss 
in every stage is uniformly evaluated. It is noteworthy that the biggest customer (1002), 
who has been used the highest number of cheques as collateral (108, while the second has 
55) and represents almost the 30% of the total of amount of cheques, is not in the list with 
the most “dangerous” customers. This happens because the proposed evaluation criterion 
accounts for the risk arising from the locus of customers in the network. 
The uniform loss hypothesis could be relaxed in accordance to different credit scoring 
characteristics and goals. For instance, a credit risk policy may prioritize the anticipation 
of financial contagion in early stages or the aversion to specific sectors of the economy 
and the diversification of the cheques received as collateral. We examine the first 
scenario of penalizing loss by the half penalty of the preceding stage: 
 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 = 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑎𝑡  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑘 !!!!!!!     (3) 
 
In Table 6 the total adjusted losses is calculated by weighting stage 0 loss with 0.5, stage 
1 losses with 0.25 and stage 2 losses with 0.125. This new criterion of systemic risk 
overturns the ordering of customers of the examined network (e.g. 1011 is relegated to 
the second position of the most “dangerous” customers).  
 
Nodes 
Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2  
Failed 
nodes 
(number) 
Value 
decrease 
(weight) 
Failed 
nodes 
(number) 
Value 
decrease 
(weight) 
Failed 
nodes 
(number) 
Value 
decrease 
(weight) 
Total 
loss 
Total 
adjusted 
loss 
1005 1 5.11 1 7.15   12.26 4.34 
1029 1 4.41 2 4.27 1 0.21 8.89 3.29 
1011 1 7.15     7.15 3.57 
Table 6: Total uniform loss and total adjusted loss due to the failure of an individual 
node. 
 
7.3.2. Case 2: composite loss 
As it was shown by our analysis, systemic risk exists in the “cheques-as-collateral” 
network. The stage-by-stage loss function (3) could become a more accurate proxy of the 
potential damage caused by a single customer by taking into account her weight in the 
network. According to the composite loss hypothesis, each customer receives a score 
depending on her weight in the network, the  𝑙!   potential damage will cause to the network 
if she bankrupts and the average weight of each funding cheque with respect to the failure 
threshold 𝑢!. The composite loss of each customer is given by the following formula: 
 𝑔! = ( !!"!""!!!!!" − 𝑢!)+𝑙! + 𝑊!"!""!!!    (4) 
 
The five customers with the highest composite loss index (𝑔) are presented in Table 7. 
 
 
Customer Composite loss (g) Weight 
1029 15,78 12,54 
1002 14,58 28,64 
1005 13,88 2,91 
1011 11,51 8,32 
1019 6,80 8,26 
Table 7: Customers with the highest composite loss index and their underlying weight. 
 
Customers with low weight could be characterized by high composite loss index (e.g. 
1005) and oppositively, customers with high weight are described by low composite loss 
(e.g. 1002, 1001). It seems that the composite loss index captures systemic risk factors, 
apart from the weight of the customer. 
 
7.3.3. Case 3: systemic risk assessment 
The composite loss function could be extended to account also for the state of cheque 
issuers in order to become a more accurate tool in the decision-making process for extra 
funding in existing customers. Specifically, we consider the “other side” (i.e. cheque 
issuer) of the systemic risk caused by the fact that customer 𝑗 intents to use as collateral a 
cheque issued by customer 𝑖. The “systemic risk assesment” of issuer 𝑖 for its new cheque 
that is brought as collateral in the network is given by:  
 𝑟!! = !"#!! ×𝑔! + 𝑟!!!!|!"  !!"!!!!!!!!    (5) 
 
In such case, banks can put upper limits not only for funded customers, but also for 
cheque issuers in order to minimize their exposure to financial contagion (five customers 
with the highest weighted out-degree are presented in Table 8).  
 
Node Systemic risk (ri) Weighted out-degree 
216 18,63 3,60 
128 12,09 5,33 
127 9,06 3,60 
029 3,07 2,84 
067 1,78 1,76 
Table 8: Customers with the highest systemic risk and their associative weighted out-
degree. 
 
Despite the fact that 216 and 127 share the same weighted out-degree, the latter is 
characterized by substantially lower systemic risk factor. That happens because 216 is 
connected to 1005 and 1013, which are characterized by high weighted out-degree but 
low failure thresholds. On the contrary, 127 is connected to 1029 which has higher failure 
threshold. Thus, 127 enjoys the fact that 1029 is less sensitive to financial contagion.     
 
8. Discussion and further research 
Globalized practices transformed financial transactions into a highly interconnected and 
complex system. Even the best analysts find hard to calculate the associated risk of every 
transaction without missing some important factor and underlying relation. Existing 
models of financial risk have been build on the dogma “too big to fail” and do not 
account for the risk of disruption to a financial entity and its spillovers to the real 
economy. Most methodologies fail to create accurate estimates of systemic risk factors 
because are based on aggregated data of financial transactions. Only recently, 
researchers and regulating bodies have been started to focus on the risk that emerges 
when critical nodes of a network cease to function as designed, disrupting linkages. 
In the present paper, a new model for estimating financial contagion in micro-level is 
proposed. Specifically, we analyze the lowest-level dimension of systemic risk and the 
associated contagion process for an individual bank by creating a network model to 
estimate the propagation of losses caused because of failure of some funded customers.  
Based on the experimentation with real data, we found that an initial failure in the 17% of 
the total value of cheques, results the subsequent failure of the 41%.  
The employment of current analysis could be twofold: (a) by complementing traditional 
credit scoring models with additional information about the systemic risk of individual 
customers and (b) by providing a useful tool for regulatory authorities in assessing more 
accurate estimates of systemic risk in many segments of the real economy. Specifically, 
the proposed model can be applied and enriched with additional financial transactions 
and entities (e.g. loans, invoices) in order to capture grass-root sources of risk. For 
instance, building and monitoring the network of private debt in micro-level could offer a 
more efficient tool in anticipating financial contagion for national interbank analysis 
agencies and international regulators. 
The proposed approach should be further explored with simulated and real datasets in 
order to identify the full spectrum of its statistical characteristics. Business implications 
in the financial sector should be also addressed. For instance, specific complementarities 
with existing risk models and efficiency measures for financial institutions [33] should be 
analyzed in detail.     
 
 
References  
[1] F. Schweitzer, G. Fagiolo, D. Sornette, F. Vega-Redondo, A. Vespignani, and D. R. 
White, “Economic networks: The new challenges,” Science, vol. 325, no. 5939, p. 422, 
2009. 
[2] S. R. Daniela Russo, Giacomo Caviglia, Chryssa Papathanassiou, Prudential and 
oversight requirements for securities settlement. European Central Bank, 2007. 
[3] Anonymous, “Recent advances in modeling systemic risk using network analysis,” 2010. 
[Online]. Available: www.ecb.int/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100107.en.htm. 
[4] R. M. May and N. Arinaminpathy, “Systemic risk: the dynamics of model banking 
systems,” Journal of the Royal Society, Interface / the Royal Society, vol. 7, no. 46, pp. 
823-38, May. 2010. 
[5] M. Mavri, V. Angelis, G. Ioannou, E. Gaki, and I. Koufodontis, “A two-stage dynamic 
credit scoring model, based on customers profile and time horizon,” Journal of Financial 
Services Marketing, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 17–27, May. 2008. 
[6] V. Assimakopoulos and M. Vafopoulos, “Financial Volatility Forecasting,” Economic & 
Financial Computing, vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 103-114, 2000. 
[7] P. Jorion, Value at risk, vol. 2. McGraw-Hill New York, 2001. 
[8] L. P. Hansen, A. W. Lo, and D. Marshall, Measuring systemic risk. 2010. 
[9] A. Barabási and R. Albert, “Emergence of scaling in random networks,” Science, vol. 286, 
no. 5439, p. 509, 1999. 
[10] R. Albert, H. Jeong, and A. Barabási, “The diameter of the world wide web,” Arxiv 
preprint cond-mat/9907038, 1999. 
[11] D. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, “Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks,” Nature, 
vol. 393, no. 6684, pp. 440–442, 1998. 
[12] M. Vafopoulos, E. Amarantidis, and I. Antoniou, “Modeling Web Evolution,” SSRN 
eLibrary. SSRN, 2011. 
[13] E. Amarantidis, I. Antoniou, and M. Vafopoulos, “Stochastic Modeling of Web 
evolution,” in SMTDA 2010: Stochastic Modeling Techniques and Data Analysis 
International Conference, Chania, Crete, Greece, 8 - 11 June 2010, 2010, pp. 45-48. 
[14] S. N. Dorogovtsev and J. F. F. Mendes, Evolution of networks: From biological nets to the 
Internet and WWW. Oxford University Press, USA, 2003. 
[15] R. Kumar, J. Novak, P. Raghavan, and A. Tomkins, “Structure and evolution of 
blogspace,” Communications of the ACM, vol. 47, no. 12, pp. 35–39, 2004. 
[16] O. D. Bandt, “Systemic risk: A survey,” ECB Working Paper No. 35, 2000. 
[17] S. Martínez-Jaramillo, O. P. Pérez, F. A. Embriz, and F. L. G. Dey, “Systemic risk, 
financial contagion and financial fragility,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 
vol. 34, no. 11, pp. 2358-2374, Nov. 2010. 
[18] J. Rochet and J. Tirole, “Interbank lending and systemic risk,” Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 1996. 
[19] C. H. Furfine, “Interbank exposures: Quantifying the risk of contagion,” Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking, pp. 111–128, 2003. 
[20] M. Blåvarg and P. Nimander, “Interbank exposures and systemic risk,” in Third Joint 
Central Bank Research Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk, 2002, p. 287. 
[21] A. Nagurney and S. Siokos, Financial Networks: Statics and Dynamics (Advances in 
Spatial Science). Springer, 1997, p. 492. 
[22] A. Nagurney, Innovations in financial and economic networks. Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2003. 
[23] K. Soramaki, M. L. Bech, J. Arnold, R. J. Glass, and W. E. Beyeler, “The topology of 
interbank payment flows,” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, vol. 379, 
no. 1, pp. 317–333, 2007. 
[24] E. Nier, J. Yang, T. Yorulmazer, and A. Alentorn, “Network models and financial 
stability,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 2033–2060, 
2007. 
[25] P. Gai and S. Kapadia, “Contagion in financial networks,” Proceedings of the Royal 
Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences, vol. 466, no. 2120, pp. 
2401-2423, Mar. 2010. 
[26] G. Iori, G. De Masi, O. V. Precup, G. Gabbi, and G. Caldarelli, “A network analysis of the 
Italian overnight money market,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, vol. 32, no. 
1, pp. 259–278, 2008. 
[27] J. Muller, “Interbank credit lines as a channel of contagion,” Journal of Financial Services 
Research, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 37–60, 2006. 
[28] T. Fruchterman, “Graph drawing by force-directed placement,” Software- Practice and 
Experience, 1991. 
[29] V. Blondel and J. Guillaume, “Fast unfolding of communities in large networks,” Journal 
of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment, 2008. 
[30] B. Baesens, T. Van Gestel, S. Viaene, M. Stepanova, J. Suykens, and J. Vanthienen, 
“Benchmarking state-of-the-art classification algorithms for credit scoring,” Journal of the 
Operational Research Society, vol. 54, no. 6, pp. 627–635, 2003. 
[31] M. Bardos, “Detecting the risk of company failure at the Banque de France,” Journal of 
Banking & Finance, vol. 22, no. 10-11, pp. 1405–1419, 1998. 
[32] L. M. Hitt and F. X. Frei, “Do better customers utilize electronic distribution channels? 
The case of PC banking,” Management Science, pp. 732–748, 2002. 
[33] A. N. Berger and D. B. Humphrey, “Efficiency of financial institutions: International 
survey and directions for future research,” European Journal of Operational Research, 
vol. 98, no. 2, pp. 175–212, 1997.  
 
